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Abstract
We argue that promoting education may be a means to re-
duce income inequality. When workers of different skill levels are
imperfect substitutes in production, an increase in the level of
human capital in the economy reduces the return to education.
Hence, a given compression of after-tax incomes can be achieved
at lower marginal tax rates. Optimal redistribution policy faces a
trade-off between the distortions of taxes on effort and the distor-
tions of education subsidies on the investment in human capital.
We discuss empirical evidence on three crucial elasticities. Our
argument explains the actual pattern of education subsidies in
OECD countries quite well.
However, there is an offsetting effect. When education and
ability are complements, high ability types take up more educa-
tion. A subsidy to education will then favor these types. We
discuss the condition for the net effect of education subsidies to
be progressive. The empirical evidence suggest that this condi-
tion is critical for a simple education subsidy. We consider some
more elaborate schemes for education subsidies.
JEL codes: H21, H52, J24, J31.
Keywords: income inequality, optimal taxation, education.
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1 Introduction
Throughout the Western world, education is heavily subsidized. Public
expenditures on education amount to some 6% of GDP on average in
OECD countries and make up a considerable share of total public expen-
ditures. Public policy regarding education typically has a broad char-
acter. Subsidies are not confined to primary education; secondary and
higher education are also heavily subsidized. Moreover, governments do
not only support schooling opportunities of the disadvantaged. In prac-
tice, government programs that encourage education also favor the rich.
This chapter is concerned with the question of whether governments
should subsidize education so heavily and comprehensively?.
The economics literature offers two main arguments for subsidies to
education. Neither of them can fully account for the wide prevalence
of education subsidies. First, the endogenous growth literature has em-
phasized that investment in human capital may have positive spillover
effects in production (Lucas, 1988, and Tamura, 1991). As these ex-
ternalities are not taken into account in individual schooling decisions,
education subsidies are needed to prevent underinvestment in education
and to promote economic growth. The externality argument calls for
subsidies directed to all educational levels and all individuals in as far as
externalities are present. However, the evidence for positive externalities
is mixed (Acemoglu and Angrist, 1999, Bils and Klenow, 2000, Krueger
and Lindahl, 2000, and Teulings and Van Rens, 2002). Second, capital
market imperfections may hinder poor individuals to finance educational
expenditures and cost of living while at school (Saint-Paul and Verdier,
1993, Perotti, 1993, and Benabou, 2000 and 2002). This argument is
hard to reconcile with the comprehensiveness of government subsidies
to education. If education subsidies only serve to attain equality of op-
portunity, subsidies targeted at the disadvantaged would be sufficient.
Moreover, the empirical evidence for borrowing constraints for educa-
tional choices is limited (Cameron and Heckman, 1998 and 1999, Keane
and Wolpin, 2001, Shea, 2000, and Cameron and Taber, 2000).
In this chapter, we discuss a new rationale for education subsidies. In
the spirit of Tinbergen (1975), we argue that education subsidies may be
a part of an optimal redistribution policy. Our argument hinges on gen-
eral equilibrium effects of an increase in human capital formation. When
workers of different skill levels are imperfect substitutes in production,
an increase in the mean level of human capital in the economy reduces
the return to human capital. The supply of high-skilled workers goes
up, reducing their relative wages, while the supply of low-skilled goes
down, increasing their relative wages. Hence, the return to human capi-
tal (the difference between both wage levels) and pre-tax wage inequal-
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ity go down. The reduction in pre-tax income inequality implies that a
given after-tax income distribution can be reached with less progressive
income taxes. Hence, by promoting education, the distortionary cost
of progressive taxation may be reduced. Optimal redistribution policy
faces a trade-off between the distortions arising from education subsidies
and the distortionary effect of income taxation.
Following Becker’s (1983) efficient redistribution hypothesis, our anal-
ysis contributes to the understanding of observed institutions. Insofar as
the political system has an incentive to consume Pareto improving pol-
icy reforms, our model provides a positive theory of the tax structure:
observed institutions should be constrained Pareto efficient. We present
some empirical evidence that observed institutions fit our model reason-
ably well. Our theory predicts a correlation between the progressivity
of the income tax and the level of education subsidies. We present data
which give some support to this hypothesis. The level of this correlation
and the average level of education subsidies, 6 % of GDP, correspond
surprisingly well with the predictions of the model for reasonable pa-
rameter values. Also, our model explains why cross country differences
in the dispersion of disposable income are primarily due to differences
in the dispersion of gross income, not to differences in the progressivity
of the tax system.
Our theoretical analysis stands in the tradition of Mirrlees’ (1971)
Noble prize winning paper on optimal income taxation. Mirrlees consid-
ers the case where worker types are perfect substitutes, so that relative
wages for various ability types are independent of supply and demand.
Imperfect substitution between worker types is crucial for our analysis.
Previously, Feldstein (1973) has analyzed this problem, and a whole 1982
issue of the Journal of Public Economics is devoted to the issue (Allen,
1982, Stern, 1982, and Stiglitz, 1982). The conclusion of these early
contributions is that imperfect substitution between types of labor does
not make a great deal of difference for realistic values of the elasticity
of substitution. Our claim is that this conclusion is largely due to an
unresolved technical problem. Where Mirrlees applied a continuous type
distribution for the perfect substitution case, a continuous type produc-
tion function with imperfect substitution was not available. Hence, a
production function with a discrete number of types (in practice: two
types, see Johnson, 1984, for a model with three types) was applied.
Teulings (2000) shows that using a production function with only two
instead of a continuum of types yields a seriously downwardly biassed
estimate of the spill-over effects of minimum wages. Our claim is that
the same problem applies for general equilibrium effects of an increase
in the mean level of human capital, since large shifts in relative wages
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within each of the types are ignored.
Our analysis calls for subsidies to all levels of education. This re-
distribution policy contrasts sharply with the usual idea of compressing
the wage distribution via compression of the distribution of human cap-
ital, that is by putting special policy effort in raising the education of
the least skilled. This latter policy relies on direct, partial equilibrium
effects of investment in human capital. However, it is unclear why a
subsidy to the human capital acquisition of the poor would dominate
generic income support. Standard economic theory suggests it does not.
Moreover, subsidies to the human capital acquisition of the poor might
run into trouble due to adverse general equilibrium effects. By a stan-
dard supply and demand argument, the additional human capital in the
lower tail of the skill distribution is likely to reduce the wages for these
skill types. Empirical evidence on the relation between the income dis-
tribution and the distribution of human capital in a panel of countries
supports these ideas. There is a strong negative relation between the
mean level of education and income inequality, supporting the general
equilibrium effect, but there seems to be no relation between the vari-
ance of education and income inequality, not supporting the direct effect.
This arguments suggests that the promotion of education at all levels
contributes more to a progressive income policy than a policy focussed
at the low levels only.
However, there is a counterforce that limits the redistributive virtues
of subsidies to education. The large literature on the ability bias in
the return to education shows that education and innate ability are
complementary (Angrist and Krueger, 1991). Subsidies to all levels of
education favor therefore predominantly the high ability types, leading
to a widening instead of a compression of the income distribution. We
face the remarkable situation that the role of the direct effect on income
(or: utility) and the substitution effect in redistribution are reversed.
Usually, redistribution is brought about by the direct effect of a policy
on income (e.g. in the case of progressive income taxation), while the
substitution effect (less productive effort) reduces its effectiveness. For
education subsidies, it is the other way around. Substitution effects
contribute to redistribution, while the direct effect on income works in
the opposite direction. We derive the condition for education subsidies to
be redistributive. Furthermore, we discuss some more elaborate schemes
for education subsidies which reduce the adverse direct effect on income,
while maintaining their favorable substitution effect.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents the
main elements of our theoretical model, based on previous work, see
Dur and Teulings (2001). Next, we review in section 3 the empirical
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evidence on three crucial elasticities in our model: elasticities of sup-
ply and demand for human capital and the degree of complementarity
between education and innate ability. Section 4 analyzes the optimal re-
distribution policy. First, we discuss efficient redistribution policy in the
absence of complementarity between ability and education. We present
some crude empirical evidence regarding the relation between education
subsidies and the progressivity of the tax system. Next, we examine how
optimal policy is affected by the complementarity between ability and
education. Section 5 discusses some further implications of our anal-
ysis. Four issues are at stake here. First, we discuss the proper level
of centralization of education policy. As the effectiveness of education
as a redistribution policy rests on an externality in schooling decisions,
education policy should be sufficiently centralized for all externalities
to be internalized. Second, we analyze the consequences of a lack of
commitment on the side of the government regarding its income pol-
icy, which limits its capability to credibly internalize the externalities.
Third, we discuss more elaborate schemes for education subsidies that
help to reduce the adverse direct effect on the income distribution due to
the complementarity between ability and education. Finally, we discuss
the role of non-linearities in the income policy. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model of the economy
Our theoretical analysis follows previous work, see Dur and Teulings
(2001). The reader who wants to understand the formal details of the
analysis should consult that reference. Here, we use a more intuitive pre-
sentation. In order to provide a clear cut separation between our model
and models based on capital market imperfections, we assume perfect
capital and insurance markets. Individuals can borrow sufficient funds
to finance their consumption during their years of education at the going
interest rate. Also, they can insure perfectly the risk on their investment
in human capital due to the uncertainty about their life expectancy. For
the sake of simplicity, we ignore the direct cost of education and focus
on the cost of foregone labor income. This fits the empirical observation
that the direct cost of education are, relatively, of minor importance.1
Individuals choose their years of schooling as to maximize their lifetime
utility. Hence, individuals invest in human capital up to the point where
the marginal cost equals the market rate of return to human capital. For
1A referee suggested that this might seriously bias our conclusions. If students’
hours and other inputs are fully complementary in the production of human capital,
the direct cost of education can be modelled as a simple surcharge on the Mince-
rian rate of return. If not, new and interesting questions arise, which are discussed
tentatively in section 5.
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the transparency of the analysis, we abstract from imperfections on the
labor market. We also abstract from production externalities in school-
ing decisions, like knowledge spillovers. Workers therefore earn their
marginal product of labor and there is no unemployment. Furthermore,
these assumptions imply that the private return to education (i.e.: the
effect on wages) is equal to the social return (i.e.: the effect on GDP).
Finally, types of labor are the only factors of production.
Our economy consists of individuals who are born with different levels
of innate ability, which we denote by a. They spend the first years h
of their life at school. These two factors, innate ability and years of
schooling, jointly determine the human capital or skill level s with which
the worker enters the labor market. After the investment in human
capital, individuals start their working career. The individual’s log wage
rate w (s, µ) per unit of effort depends on the individual’s human capital
s and on µ, the mean level of human capital among the workers in the
economy. The partial derivative of log wages ∂w/∂s is the Mincerian
rate of return to human capital. Gross income is the product of this
wage rate and the effort the individual chooses to provide. Individuals
set effort as to maximize their utility. We follow Diamond (1998) in
simplifying the analysis by applying a utility function that is additive in
the cost of effort and consumption. This additive specification rules out
income effects on the supply of effort. The supply of effort of a worker
is therefore increasing in her (net) wage rate.
Subsequently, we discuss the two most important building blocks
of our model, the production function of human capital and relative
wages, more extensively. For this discussion, it is useful to define a
benchmark equilibrium of this economy. For this, we take the non-
interventionist, redistribution free equilibrium, where the government
does not implement any income policy, so that the income distribution
is fully determined by market forces. Without loss of generality, we
normalize our measure of human capital s such that in this redistribution
free equilibrium, its Mincerian rate of return to human capital is unity,
∂w/∂s ≡ ws = 1, and its mean is equal to zero, µ = 0. We shall apply
one further normalization in this redistribution free equilibrium below.
2.1 Human capital production
The human capital of a worker is a function of two inputs, her innate
ability a and the years of education h:
s (a, h) = a+ (βh− ξa)− 1
2
ψ (βh− ξa)2 (1)
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where β, ξ, and ψ are (weakly) positive parameters. Without loss of
generality, we normalize the ability measure a such that in this redis-
tribution free equilibrium, βh − ξa = 0. The marginal return of an
additional year of schooling is given by the partial derivative of s (a, h)
with respect to h:
sh = β [1− ψ (βh− ξa)] (2)
Since βh− ξa = 0 in the redistribution free equilibrium, β measures the
marginal return to a year of education, sh = β. The term −ψ (βh− ξa)
in equation (2) captures two essential features of the model, the decreas-
ing returns to education, shh ≤ 0, and complementarity of ability and
education, sha ≥ 0. Both features are discussed in some detail.
The decreasing returns to education provide an interpretation of the
parameter ψ in the redistribution free equilibrium:
− d ln sh
wsshdh
= − shh
wss
2
h
= ψ (3)
since ws = 1 and sh = β in the redistribution free equilibrium. The
numerator of the left hand side is the relative change in the return to
education, its denominator is the relative change in the value of the
human capital of the worker, evaluated at market prices (since wsshdh
measures the effect a change dh in the years of education on the log wage
w). In the redistribution free equilibrium, workers set Mincerian rate of
return to a year of education, wssh, equal to its price. Hence, ψ
−1 is the
price elasticity of the supply of human capital : the percentage change in
the value of human capital per percent change in its price.2
The parameter ξ captures the complementarity between ability and
education. When ξ = 0, the marginal return to a year of education
(keeping h fixed) does not depend on innate ability. Hence, optimal
years of schooling is independent of innate ability. When ξ > 0, people
with higher innate ability benefit more from schooling and, hence, they
take up more years of schooling. We offer a simple interpretation of ξ.
Consider equation (2). Workers choose their optimal years of education
as to equate the marginal cost and revenue of a year of education. In
2Usually, the price elasticity of the supply of human capital θ is defined not with
respect to the value of human capital, but with respect to the years of education:
θ ≡ − d lnhd ln sh
= − shshhh
=
1
wsshh
ψ−1
However, since the average years of education E[h] ∼= 10 and since the Mincerian
rate of return wssh ∼= 10% in developed economies, both concepts happen to be
numerically the same.
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the redistribution free equilibrium:
wssh
λ
= 1 (4)
where λ is the sum of the interest rate and the rate of depreciation of the
human. Most studie suggest λ to be around 10%. Let W be the wage
level. The wage gain of an additional year of education is Wwssh. The
lifetime revenue of an additional year of education is the net discounted
value of this wage increase, using λ as the discount rate. The cost of
an additional year is the foregone labor income W . Dividing both sides
by W yields equation (4).3 Workers set h such that sh = λ/ws, which
is independent of h in the redistribution free equilibrium, since ws is
independent of h by assumption. Since sh is independent of h, βh− ξa
must a constant, see equation (2), or equivalently, years of education is
a function of ability h (a) with dh (a) /da = ξ/β > 0. By equation (1):
s (a, h)= a+ constant
ds [a, h (a)]
da
= sa + sh
dh
da
= sa +
ξ
β
sh = 1
In this world, we would never be able to estimate the ”true” return to
education sh, even if we had perfect information on the worker’s ability.
This is the case of a complete ability bias in the return to education.
Ability and schooling are perfectly collinear in market equilibirum, since
h (a) is a function of a. Hence, we have no independent variation of h.
Any variation in s (a, h) can be equally well attributed to variation in
year of education h as to variation in ability a.
Let us suppose that, from the point of view of the researcher, this
is too gloomy a picture of the real world. Workers do not set their
years of education exactly as predicted by the model, so that there is
some random variation in h independent of a. Some workers have some
kind of special preference for education, and choose therefore to take
more education. Others simply make small optimization mistakes. This
type of randomness in h would resolve the multicollinearity problem and
allow us to identify sa and sh separately, with sa = 1− ξ.4 This suggests
3Equation (4) ignores some terms that appear to be irrelevant in the full model,
like difference in the level of effort when working and when at school. We omitted
these here for the sake transparency. See Dur and Teulings (2001) for these issues.
4We apply a first order Taylor expansion of h around its equilibrium value h (a).
Since βh (a)−ξa is a constant, the second order term −12ψ [βh (a)− ξa]
2 in equation
(1) can be ignored. Rewriting the remaining terms yields:
s (a, h) = (1− ξ) a+ βh+ constant
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a simple trick to estimate ξ. We can approximate s by log wages w.
Consider the coefficients on ability in two log wage regressions, one with
only ability as regressor, and another with both ability and years of
education. The ratio of both regression coefficients should be equal to:
sa
ds[a,h(a)]
da
= 1− ξ
We apply this methodology to obtain a rough estimate of ξ in Section
3.3. However, this equation also provides an interpretation of ξ: it is the
share of the return to ability that can only be realized by exploiting the
complementarity of ability and education. Without education, a fraction
ξ of the potential return to ability would be lost.
2.2 Production and relative wages
The wage rates for each skill type s depend on their supply and demand.
Labor supply is determined by the distribution of innate ability and
the production of human capital. Labor demand is determined by the
aggregate production function, such that the wages for each skill type are
equal to their marginal productivity in market equilibrium. We simplify
the analysis by constructing the production function such that log wages
w (s, µ) are linear in s:
w (s, µ) = w0 (µ) + exp (−γµ) s (5)
where γ is a (weakly) positive parameter. This relation is derived from
assignment or matching models in the tradition of Rosen (1974), Sat-
tinger (1975), and Teulings (1995). In the appendix, we offer a formal
derivation. The Mincerian rate of return to human capital is equal to
the partial derivative of log wages:
ws = exp (−γµ)
The rate of return is a decreasing function of the mean level of human
capital in the economy, µ. This captures the imperfect substitutability
between workers with various degrees of human capital. Were workers
perfect substitutes, γ would be equal to zero and relative wages would
be independent of the supply of human capital in the economy.
This representation of imperfect substitution deviates from the com-
monly used CES production function with two broad types of labor,
high and low skilled (see for example the much cited empirical study
by Katz and Murphy (1992)). In such a two type framework, the full
burden of imperfect substitution is put a the borderline between both
broad types, since within each broad type workers are perfect substi-
tutes. Hence, relative wages can only change between broad types, not
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within. Our interpretation allows for a continuum of worker types, each
endowed with its own level of human capital s and with its own wage
rate. In our economy these workers have to be assigned to jobs, which
differ by their complexity, see Teulings (2002). The driving force of this
model is the Ricardian concept of comparative advantage: highly-skilled
workers have a comparative advantage in complex jobs since skills have
a greater effect on worker productivity in more complex jobs. In the
Walrasian equilibrium, highly-skilled workers will therefore be assigned
to more complex jobs, where their skills yield the highest return. A gen-
eral increase in the level of human capital reduces the return to human
capital, since high skilled workers have to do less complex jobs, where
their human capital has a lower return. Alternatively, an increase in the
mean of the skill distribution µ raises the supply of high skilled workers,
thereby reducing wages for the high skilled, and reduces the supply of
low skilled workers, thereby raising wages for the low skilled. Hence, the
return to human capital, and thus wage dispersion, decrease when the
mean level of human capital goes up. The size of this effect depends on
the degree of substitutability between skill types. The smaller the de-
gree of substitutability, as measured by γ, the more the return to human
capital decreases for a given increase in the stock of human capital.
This model exhibits the Distance Dependent Elasticity of Substitu-
tion (DIDES) structure: the larger the ”distance” of two types in terms
of their level of human capital, the lower the substitutability between
worker types. The situation is illustrated in Figure 1. When an individ-
ual worker raises her human capital from s to s+dµ while all other work-
ers keep their human capital constant, her wage goes up by ws (µ) dµ,
which is a shift along the curve. However, when all workers do the same,
there is an additional, general equilibrium effect, shown as a twist of the
curve to a flatter position. The mean µ goes up by dµ. Hence, the wage
function twists and the return to human capital falls. This ”twisting” is
due to substitution processes. Since substitution effects sum to zero (for
a constant return to scale economy), the workers with an above average
level of human capital will lose, while the workers in the lower tier of the
labor market gain. Somewhere in the middle, there is a break even point.
These indirect effects of human capital acquisition can be interpreted as
a distributive externality of schooling decisions. An individual’s decision
to invest in human capital increases the stock of human capital in the
economy, and reduces, therefore, the return on this capital.
FIGURE 1
We can offer an interpretation of parameter γ in the redistribution
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free equilibrium, similar to that of ψ:
−d lnws
wsdµ
= −wsµ
w2s
= γ (6)
since ws = 1 in the redistribution free equilibrium. The parameter γ can
therefore be interpreted as the compression elasticity: the percentage
reduction in the return to human capital, d lnws, per percent increase
in the value of the stock of human capital, wsdµ, evaluated at market
prices. Alternatively, its inverse γ−1 is the price elasticity of demand
for human capital, the counterpart of ψ−1 for the demand side of the
market.
3 Some empirical evidence
3.1 The demand-elasticity for human capital: γ−1
The crucial mechanism in our model is that an increase in the mean level
of human capital causes its return to fall, due to imperfect substitution
between types of labor. A lower return to education leads to a compres-
sion of the wage distribution. With perfect substitution between skill
types, relative wages, and hence wage dispersion would be independent
of the supply of human capital in the economy. Since this mechanism is
crucial for our analysis, we review a number of studies documenting this
relation.
There is substantial direct evidence for a negative relation between
the stock of human capital in the economy and income dispersion. Tilak
(1989) provides some early cross country evidence. In addition, there
are a number of case studies for various countries. Goldin and Margo
(1992), Goldin and Katz (1999), and Goldin (1999) examine the returns
to schooling and the dispersion of the wage structure in the US between
World War I and II. Educational returns clearly decreased during this
period and the wage structure narrowed. Goldin and coauthors relate
these developments to the enormous expansion of secondary schooling
beginning in the 1910s. Only after 1980, following a period of low inflow
into the university system, the return to education and the dispersion of
wages started to increase again (see Card and Lemieux, 2000). In most
other countries, the education revolution started later. Consequently,
the fall in the return to education and the narrowing of the wage struc-
ture also lagged behind (see Hartog, Oosterbeek, and Teulings (1993) for
the Netherlands 1960-1985; Edin and Holmlund (1995) for Sweden; Kim
and Topel (1995) for South Korea in sixties and seventies). All these
studies find that income dispersion is negatively related to the supply of
human capital.
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Katz andMurphy (1992) provide evidence for imperfect substitutabil-
ity for the post-war period in the United States, using a two types CES
function. They estimate the elasticity of substitution between high and
low skilled workers from time series data for the US. They estimate the
elasticity to be 1.4, supporting the idea of imperfect substitution be-
tween worker types. This elasticity drives the negative relation between
the return to human capital and its supply in the post war economic his-
tory of the United States. This elasticity of substitution between high
and low skilled workers translates into a compression elasticity of about
2.5 Hence, an increase of the average education level by one year at an
initial return to education of 10% leads to an increase in the value of
the stock of human capital by 10%. That increase causes the return to
human capital to fall by 2× 10% = 20%, that is, from 10% to 8%.
Figure 2, taken from Teulings and Van Rens (2002), provides some
direct evidence on the relation between the return to human capital for
some 50 countries as measured directly from individual data on the one
hand, and on the mean level of education and on income inequality on
the other hand. There is a clear negative relation between the return to
education and average years of schooling, suggesting that skill types are
indeed imperfect substitutes in production, see Panel A. Panel B relates
the return to education to income inequality. There is a strong posi-
tive relationship. Taken together, the results suggest that by increasing
average years of schooling, income inequality may be reduced. Some
simple regressions based on the data presented in Figure 2 reveal that
the return to education is about 16% for countries with no education at
all, and decreases by about 0.7% for every increase of one year in the
average year of schooling.
FIGURE 2
Teulings and Van Rens (2002) analyze the evolution of log GDP
per capita and the variance of log wages due to shifts in the stock of
human capital in a panel of 100 countries over the period 1960-1990. In
a perfect Walrasian world, the effect of the average years of education
S on GDP should be equal to the Mincerian rate of return to human
capital, since the Mincerian rate of return measures the effect of an
additional year of education on wages, and since wages are equal to
5Teulings (2002) derives a relation between the compression elasticity and the
elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled workers:
γ = 1
Var [w]× ηlow-high
∼=
1
0.602 × 1.4
∼= 2
where Var[w] is the variance of log wages and ηlow-high is the substitution elasticity
between low and high skilled labor.
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(marginal) productivity. If this return is negatively related to the mean
level of education in the economy due to imperfect substitution, then
the same should for the marginal effect of education on GDP:
logGDP =β0 + β1S −
1
2
β2S
2 (7)
d logGDP
dS
=
dw
dh
= β1 − β2S
where S is the average number of years of education h in the economy.
Hence, in a growth regression, we expect a positive effect of increases
in the mean level of education, and a negative second order effect of
increases in the mean level of education.6 For the variance of log wages,
the following relation applies:
Var [w] =
µ
dw
dh
¶2
Var [h] =
¡
β1 − 2β1β2S + β2S2
¢
Var [h] (8)
The variance is a negative function of the average years of education in
the economy.
Table 1 provides evidence from regressions on panel data for log GDP
per capita and for the variance of log wages based on equation (7) and
(8). Panel A presents a regression for log GDP on average years of
schooling and years of schooling squared. The regression is run in first
differences, using a ten year time frame and controlling for the level of
log GDP in the previous period. The effect of a year of education on
GDP according to these regressions is much higher than the Mincerian
rate of human capital as usually measured, about 24%. However, due
to the presence of the second order effect, this return is measured at
an average level of human capital of zero. The coefficient of the second
order term suggests β2 = 2 × 0.8% = 1.6% per year increase in the
stock of human capital. The regressions presented in panel B on the
variance of log income provide evidence for a negative effect of schooling
on income inequality. We present three regression, one in levels, one in
first differences (to eliminate fixed country effects), and one where we
allow only for a first order effect in S, since the first and the second order
effect are highly collinear. Using the latter regression, a one year increase
6This interpretation of the role of human capital in the evolution of GDP contrasts
sharply with the endogenous growth literature, where the relation between schooling
and growth is driven by externalities. For instance, in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999),
a higher level of education makes the labor force more able to deal with technological
innovations. This yields a relation between the level of education and growth, not
the level of GDP, see Krueger and Lindahl (2000) for a discussion.
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in average years of education reduces the variance of log income by 0.05.
The effect is somewhat larger in the equation measured in levels.7
TABLE 1
One can use these numbers to calculate the value of the compression
elasticity γ implied by the estimates. Starting from a return to human
capital of 10 % and using the 1.5 % decline per year of additional human
capital, the compression elasticity reads:8
γ =
0.015
0.102
= 1.5
Hence, Teulings and Van Rens’s estimate of the size of the compression
elasticity is broadly consistent with Katz and Murphy’s (1992) estimate
of the elasticity of substitution between low and high skilled labor. We
apply a value of γ of 2 in our subsequent calculations.
3.2 The supply-elasticity of human capital: ψ−1
The second important parameter in our analysis is the price elasticity
of demand. This elasticity determines the effectiveness of subsidies in
increasing the stock of human capital. The larger is the elasticity of
schooling, the larger the effect of subsidies to education on the aver-
age level of human capital. Stanley (1999) analyzes the effects of the
GI Bill education subsidies for veterans from WW II and the Korean
war on their educational attainment. The GI Bill reduced the cost of
education by 50 % for Korean veterans and even by 60 % for WW II
veterans. However, not all veterans of the Korean war were entitled to
this subsidy, depending on a completely arbitrary rule regarding the date
of enlistment. This ”random” selection provides a natural experiment
for testing the effect of financial incentives on educational attainment.
The effects of these subsidies are necessarily limited to veterans with
higher educational attainment, since they left the military at the age of
23. At that age, a substantial fraction has completed its investment in
human capital. This fits the observation: only 40 % of the Korean vet-
erans who were eligible took up any grants at all. Consistent with this
observation, the veterans that took up grants descended predominantly
from parents with a higher social economic status (SES). Among those
eligible, educational attainment has increased on average by 1/3 year.
Were the subsidy effective for all education levels, the effect would have
7We can backout an estimate for β2 from these regressions. Since Var[h] ∼= 12.6
and using β1 = 0.24, the coefficient of the first order term suggests β2 = 0.092×12.6×0.24 =
1.5% per year.
8Recall, by (6): γ = −d lnwswsdµ . Hence, γ =
d(log dwdh )/dS
d logGDP
dS
= β2
(β1−β2S)2
= 0.0150.102 = 1.5
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been 1
3×40%
∼= 0.85 year. Hence, the price-elasticity of the supply edu-
cation equals: 0.85
10×50% = 0.17, or ψ = 6. For WW II veterans, the data
allow a more refined disaggregation by SES. There, the upper quintile of
the SES distribution achieves a gain in educational attainment of even 2
years. Hence, the semi-elasticity is: 2
10×60% = 0.33, or ψ = 3. One might
suppose that for the group of veterans the cost of education has been
higher than it would have been in case their educational career had not
been interrupted by the war. We use a value for ψ of 4 in the subsequent
calculations.
3.3 Complementarity of education and ability: ξ
In section 2.1, we discussed a simple trick to establish ξ: run two log wage
regressions, one with only ability as explanatory variable, and another
with both ability and years of education. The ratio of the regression
coefficients on ability should be equal to 1 − ξ. Table 2 presents the
results of this type of regressions. Ability is measured by test scores.
We use only males to avoid all the selectivity issues that arise due to
women’s labor supply decisions. We have data for three countries, for
each at two points in time: the UK (NCD dataset and BCS dataset),
the Netherlands (1983 and 1993), and the US (1974 and 1992).9 For
each dataset, we present two regressions: one with ability as the only
explanatory variable, the other with both ability and years of schooling
as explanatory variables. For the UK datasets, we have two variables for
ability, one based on a math test the other on a reading test. Both are
included in the regressions. This evidence suggest a value for ξ of about
0.3 to 0.6.
TABLE 2
4 Efficient redistribution policy
4.1 Government’s policy instruments
We can now analyze what would be the optimal policy rule for a gov-
ernment that wants to redistribute income, and wants to do so in the
most efficient way. We take for granted that this government wants to
redistribute progressively, from the rich to the poor, but our analysis ap-
plies likewise for a degressive redistribution, from the poor to the rich.
Let d be the worker’s log disposable income made available by the gov-
ernment. The government is assumed not to provide grants to students
still at school. Their net income is zero and they must finance their
consumption by borrowing. At first sight, this seems to be an impor-
9We thank Peter Dolton for the regressions on UK data, Hessel Oosterbeek for
those on Dutch data, and Erik Plug for those on US data.
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tant limitation to our analysis. However, it is not. Due to the perfect
nature of capital markets, the introduction of a grant financed from a
reduction of dh would be offset by a reduction of the take up of credit
by individuals during their years at school, leaving their lifetime con-
sumption path, their years of education h, and their level of productive
effort unaffected. Hence, the effect of grants for students is equivalent to
subsidies for working individuals based on their educational attainment.
We incorporate education subsidies in the income tax system only for
analytical convenience.
As in Mirrlees’ (1971) seminal paper on optimal income taxation,
the government can observe neither effort, nor innate ability, nor the
skill level that is obtained by taking up education. It can only observe
the years of schooling taken by an individual, h, and her gross log labor
income y. The latter is equal to the wage rate per unit of effort times
effort, in logs y = w + e, where e is log effort. The income policy can
therefore be contingent on h and y only. We simplify our analysis at this
point by considering log linear income policies only:
d = d0 + dyy + dhh = d0 + dy (w + e) + dhh
The parameter d0, dy, and dh are the policy instruments of the govern-
ment. In a non-interventionist, redistribution free equilibrium, we have:
d0 = 0, dy = 1, dh = 0, so that d = y. The parameter dy is Musgrave and
Musgrave’s coefficient of residual income progression and measures the
progressivity of the income tax. The special case dy = 1 yields a pro-
portional tax system. Progressive income taxation implies dy < 1. The
log linear specification implies a constant elasticity of net with respect
to gross income. This constant elasticity specification implies that the
marginal tax rate is increasing for dy < 1, a feature which turns out to
be important for the subsequent discussion. The parameter dh measures
the subsidy for taking up an additional year of education relative to the
net discounted value of disposable income; dh < 0 implies a tax on edu-
cation. Analogous to equation (4) for the redistribution free equilibrium,
the first order condition for the optimal years of education in this new,
redistributive equilibrium reads:10
dywssh
λ
= 1− dh
λ
Setting the policy parameters equal to the redistribution free case, dy =
1, dh = 0, yields condition (4). The left hand side measure the return to
10Like in equation (4), some slight complications that arise in the full model are
ignored here.
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an additional year of education. A progressive tax, dy < 1, reduces the
private return to education. Hence, workers’ privately optimal choice
is to take up less education. The right hand side measures the cost of
education. The education subsidy raises yearly disposable income by a
fraction dh. This benefit is discounted at a value λ. Where the first
term on the right hand side measure total social cost of education (the
foregone labor income), dh/λ measures the subsidies to education as a
share of total cost, or alternatively, the marginal subsidy rate. A subsidy
to education dh raises the level of educational attainment.
As in Mirrlees (1971), redistributive income taxes distort the choice
of effort, as marginal revenue of effort from the point of view of the in-
dividual is below that for the society as a whole. Similarly, a subsidy or
a tax to education distorts the take up of education. Policy makers face
therefore the trade off between efficiency and redistribution. The ques-
tion of interest is what combination of education subsidies (or: taxes)
and income taxation yields the lowest distortion for a given amount
of redistribution. The government’s choice of feasible income policies,
characterized by d0, dy, and dh, is obviously constrained by a budget
constraint, which tells that the sum of labor income for all ability types,
exp (w + e), must be equal to the sum of the disposable income for all
types, exp (y). This budget constraint is used to eliminate d0 from the
set of available policy instruments. Intuitively, the policy maker first
chooses dy and dh to realize his goals with respect to the income distri-
bution, and he then adjusts d0 to balance the budget. It turns out that,
given the convenient, log linear structure of all our equations, the life
time utility of worker of type a is also linear in a:
u (a; dy, dh) = u0 (dy, dh) + ua(dy, dh)a (9)
where u (a; dy, dh) is the lifetime utility of worker type a conditional on
the policy variables dy and dh. The function u0 (·) is the utility level
of a worker with innate ability zero. The function ua (·) describes how
a worker’s utility depends on his innate ability. It should be stressed
that (9) is not a social welfare function. However, we can think of the
parameters u0 (·) and ua (·) as the goals of the policy maker, where ua (·)
measures income (or better: utility) inequality and u0 (·) measures the
efficiency of the economy. Amore egalitarian income policy reduces ua (·)
at the cost of a lower u0 (·). An efficient redistribution policy sets dy and
dh to maximize u0 (·), taking as given the value of ua (·) (i.e., the distri-
butional preference of the policy maker). In the subsequent sections, we
characterize for any feasible level of inequality ua (·), the mix of policy
instruments dy and dh that minimizes efficiency losses, i.e. maximizes
u0 (·). We refer to these combinations dy and dh as constrained Pareto ef-
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ficient. The adjective ”constrained” refers to information constraints on
effort, ability, and skill, which limit the policy options that are available
to the government. The subsequent sections will analyze these efficient
redistribution policies, first, ignoring the complementarity between abil-
ity and education, and, second, allowing for this complementarity.
4.2 Efficient redistribution without complementar-
ity: ξ = 0
Without complementarity of ability and education, all individuals choose
the same years of schooling and education subsidies have no direct effect
on the income distribution. The only way in which education subsi-
dies affect the income distribution is through general equilibrium effects
on the labor market. If the compression elasticity is positive (i.e., skill
types are imperfect substitutes), education subsidies contribute to re-
distribution. The optimal level of education subsidies depends on the
political demand for redistribution as well as the distortionary effects of
the policy instruments.
The following equation describes for any level of distributional pref-
erence ua (·), the constrained Pareto efficient ratio of tax progressivity
1− dy and education subsidies dh/λ:
dh
λ
=
·
1 +
η
(1 + η)2
γ
¸
(1− dy) (10)
where η is the wage elasticity of effort supply. In the absence of a strive
for redistribution, dy = 1, optimal education subsidies are equal to zero.
Hence, the redistribution free equilibrium, dy = 1, dh = 0, is constrained
Pareto efficient. This mirrors the first theorem of Welfare economics:
with perfect markets, investment in human capital is Pareto efficient. If
there is no demand for redistribution, the best a policy maker can do is
not to intervene in the market mechanism.
When the government wants to redistribute income from rich to poor,
both progressive taxes and education subsidies should be used, since in
(10), if dy < 1 then dh > 0. Education subsidies are optimal in our
model for two reasons, corresponding to the two terms within square
brackets. The first term captures the effect that education subsidies
offset the disincentive effects of increasing marginal tax rates on school-
ing. Progressive income taxation implies that the benefits of education
(higher future earnings) are taxed at a higher rate than foregone earn-
ings. Therefore, individuals underinvest in human capital, which should
be corrected by providing education subsidies, see Bovenberg and Jacobs
(2001). The relevance of this effect depends on the functional form of the
tax scheme. Our log linear system does indeed imply increasing marginal
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rates. However, a linear scheme would not yield this effect, since then
marginal rates were constant. Hence, we do not want to stress this effect
here. It just shows up due to the convenient log linear specification of
income policy.
The second term refers to the general equilibrium effects of education,
which are relevant when types of labor are less than perfect substitutes,
γ > 0. Then, a constrained Pareto efficient income policy requires a
subsidy to education above the subsidy required to offset the distortions
of the income tax. By encouraging schooling, wages are compressed,
implying smaller pre-tax income inequality. Hence, a given after-tax
income distribution can be reached with less progressive income taxes,
and hence less distortionary cost of progressive taxation. Just like pro-
gressive income taxes, education subsidies entail distortions. The opti-
mal subsidy to education induces individuals to overinvest in education.
The distortion in the schooling decision due to the education subsidy is
traded off against the distortion in the effort decision due to marginal
tax rates. The optimal redistribution policy mixes both distortions, in
line with the principles of tax smoothing. The higher the compression
elasticity, γ, the stronger the compression of relative wages by additional
investment in human capital, and hence the higher is the optimal value
of education subsidies. For the relevant range of η < 1, the optimal
subsidy is increasing in η. The more elastic the supply of effort η, the
higher the distortion caused by marginal tax rates, and hence the higher
is the optimal subsidy to education. Note that the price elasticity of
the demand for schooling does not show up in this equation. Since the
schooling decision is distorted by both progressive taxation and subsidies
to education, the elasticity (measuring the size of the welfare loss) does
not affect the ratio between income taxes and subsidies to education.
The subsidy to education can be interpreted as a Pigouvian subsidy
to offset an externality in individual schooling decisions. When deciding
to take up an additional year of education, the individual raises the mean
level of human capital in the economy and therefore compresses wage
differentials. This generates both positive and negative income effects
for other workers. The value weighted sum of these effects is exactly zero
(as applies always for substitution effects in a constant returns to scale
economy). However, this compression effect is a positive externality from
the point of view of the policy maker, who wants to redistribute income
from the rich to the poor and who can do so only at an efficiency cost
when using other instruments. We refer to this effect as a distributional
externality.
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4.3 Some empirical evidence on efficient redistribu-
tion
When we follow Becker (1983) and interpret our model as a positive
theory of the policy mix used for redistribution, the model predicts
that countries with a stronger preference for redistribution and hence,
a stronger progressivity of the tax system, have higher public spending
on education. Figure 3, taken from Van Ewijk and Tang (2000), pro-
vides some crude evidence on these issues, just to give an idea of the
orders of magnitude implied by the model. The horizontal axis plots
education subsidies as a percentage of GDP while the vertical axis plots
dy, the percentage change in after-tax income when the before-tax wage
rises with 1%.11 There is a clear relation between the progressivity of
the income tax and the level of education subsidies: countries with a
more progressive income tax (a lower value of dy) tend to have higher
education subsidies.
FIGURE 3
Remarkably, the actual level of subsidies to education and its relation
to the progressivity of income taxes is close to what our model predicts.
Clearly, when taxes are proportional (dy = 1), subsidies to education
should be zero. This is consistent with the data in Figure 3. The model
allows a crude calculation of the optimal level of subsidies to education
as a share of GDP, ignoring the effect of the increasing marginal tax rate
(the first term between square brackets in equation (10)). The efficient
level of education subsidies for redistributive purposes depends on the
values of η and γ. As discussed in the previous section, an empirically
plausible value for γ is 2. Similar to Diamond (1998), we assume the
supply elasticity of effort η to be equal to a half. The coefficient of
residual income progression (dy) is on average 0.85 in OECD countries
(see also Figure 3). Hence, for the average OECD country, imperfect
substitution justifies a subsidy to education of approximately 7% of the
cost of foregone labor income:
dh
λ
=
ηγ
(1 + η)2
(1− dy) ∼= 0.44× (1− 0.85) ∼= 7%
Suppose that the average worker takes up 10 years of education, which is
a reasonable value for OECD countries, and suppose that labor accounts
for 2
3
of GDP. Then, subsidies to education as a percentage of GDP
11Clearly, this is only a crude measure of tax progressivity. For instance, Figure
3 does not take into account differences in tax progressivity between countries as a
result of differences in VAT.
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should be:
2
3
× 10× 0.44× 0.10× (1− 0.85) = 4.4%
For the mean level of progressivity of income taxes in OECD countries,
subsidies to education for the purpose of redistribution should account
for approximately 4.4 % of GDP. This is close to the actual value of 5.5%.
Our argument for education subsidies thus goes a long way towards
explaining the actual pattern and level of education subsidies in OECD
countries.
4.4 Allowing for complementarity of ability and ed-
ucation
When we allow for complementarity between education and innate abil-
ity, it is no longer clear whether education subsidies contribute to redis-
tribution of income from rich to poor. On the one hand, by stimulating
human capital formation, education subsidies reduce wage dispersion be-
cause skill types are imperfect substitutes in production. On the other
hand, the complementarity between education and ability implies that
individuals with high ability go to school longer. Since the amount of
education subsidies is increasing in the years of education an individual
takes up, education subsidies disproportionately favor the people with
high ability. Hence, the complementarity of education and ability may
cause education subsidies to increase income dispersion.
The constrained Pareto efficient level of education subsidies allowing
for complementarity between ability and education is described by:
dh
λ
=
·
1 +
η
(1 + η)2
(1− ξ) γ − ψξ
1− ξ
¸
(1− dy) (11)
The first term between square brackets in equation (11) is again the
subsidy to education needed to correct for the distortionary effect of
progressive taxation on the schooling decisions. Like in the previous
section, we ignore this effect in the subsequent discussion. The second
term consist of two opposing force, the progressive general equilibrium
effect of education subsidies and the degressive direct effect on income
due to the higher take up of education by high ability / high income
types. The condition for the former effect to dominate the latter reads:
ψξ < (1− ξ) γ
The condition has a simple economic interpretation. The parameter ξ
is the share of wage dispersion that is attributable to the cost of hu-
man capital acquisition, while ψ−1 is the price elasticity of the supply
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of education. Hence, the left hand side is the adverse direct effect of
the subsidy: the increase in inequality due to a subsidization of the cost
of human capital acquisition per value unit increase in the average hu-
man capital. The right hand side measures the reduction in inequality:
1 − ξ is the share of wage dispersion that is directly attributable to
ability differentials, while γ−1 is the price elasticity of the demand for
education. Whether this condition is satisfied is sensitive to the exact
empirical values of the relevant parameters. For the values discussed
before, both sides of the inequality are just equal, which implies that
the direct income effect of education subsidies is as large as the indirect
substitution effect. Hence, education subsidies do not contribute to re-
distribution. Much depends, however, on what one believes about the
price elasticity of the demand for education. The higher the elasticity,
the more education should be subsidized. The intuition is straightfor-
ward: the higher the elasticity, the lower education subsidies need to be
for a given compression of wages, the smaller is the direct income effect.
Moreover, a clever policy design may mitigate the direct income effects
while maintaining the indirect substitution effect on income inequality.
Examples of this will be discussed in subsections 5.3 and 5.4.
5 Further implications
5.1 The adequate level of centralization
As discussed before, our argument for subsidizing education rests on an
externality in individual schooling decisions. Individuals do not take into
account the effect of their schooling on pre-tax wage inequality and, thus,
on the distortions arising from progressive income taxation. Decision
making must be sufficiently centralized to internalize externalities.
Consider the case of a small district in a large country. Either labor
is mobile or there is free trade of products between districts, or both.
Hence, by the Heckscher-Ohlin factor price equalization theorem, rela-
tive wages are then determined by the nation wide skill distribution, not
that in the own district. Evaluated at the decentralized level, education
subsidies increase the dispersion of utility when ability and education
are complementary. Since the district is too small to have an effect on
relative wages in the economy, the only distributive effect stems from
the complementarity between ability and education in skill formation.
Without complementarity, education subsidies are only used to offset
the distortionary effect of increasing marginal tax rates on schooling de-
cisions. With complementarity, progressive taxation is combined with a
subsidy to education which is lower than the subsidy needed to offset
tax distortions. When there is strong complementarity, even a tax on ed-
22
ucation may become constrained Pareto efficient at the decentral level.
Clearly, taxing education contributes to redistribution as high-ability
types take up more education than low-ability types. The (local) distor-
tionary effect on schooling decisions is traded off against the disincentive
effect of the other redistributive instrument, progressive taxation. Since
the general equilibrium effect of education subsidies on relative wages
is not taken into account at the decentralized level, subsidies are inef-
ficiently low. Hence, decentralization yields underinvestment in human
capital.
The case discussed above matches closely the US institutional struc-
ture, where decisions on education are made at the level of school dis-
tricts. The main difference is that the tax policy is decided predomi-
nantly at a federal level. This feature of the US system may strengthen
our result that decentralized bodies provide too low subsidies to edu-
cation. The reason is that central decision making on taxes introduces
an additional externality in decentralized decision making, discouraging
investment in human capital. While in the analysis above the direct
consequences of underinvestment in human capital for the government
budget are fully taken into account, this is no longer the case if local in-
come is subject to federal taxes. Studying these issue more fully would
require the introduction of separate budget constraints for the school
district and the federal government.
5.2 Time consistency of the policy
So far, we have studied optimal income policy from the perspective of
an individual at the beginning of his life. Moreover, we have assumed
that the optimal income policy is set once and for all. In this section,
we relax both assumptions to gain insight into the political viability
of education subsidies in a world where the decisive voter has already
started his working career and cannot commit to future policies.
Consider a dynamic economy where old generations die and new gen-
erations enter the labor force. Inhabitants differ along two dimensions.
First, they are either at school or working. Second, they differ according
to their ability level. For simplicity, we assume that while at school,
inhabitants vote as if they are working. In this way we ignore slight
differences between the interest of those at school and those working.
The main interest is within generations: the low ability people have an
interest in past accumulation of human capital (because of general equi-
librium effects on relative wages) and today expropriation of the fruits
of human capital (for redistribution).
The temptation to expropriate the fruits of past human capital for-
mation conflicts with the desire to stimulate current human capital for-
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mation by young generations. In particular, consider the median voter
at a particular point in time. He is tempted to ignore the effect of income
policy on schooling decisions. Since years of schooling are assumed to
be observable, this implies that he can fully expropriate the high abil-
ity types who have taken up more education (since innate ability and
education are complements). However, in that case, future generations
of new entrants will no longer invest in education. This will gradually
depress the mean education level among the workforce, thereby raising
gross wage differentials, at the expense of the median voter. Since the
median voter expects to live beyond today, he is also negatively affected
by this long run negative effect on his gross wage rate.
Interestingly, one can prove that when voters cannot commit on their
future voting behavior, the political process brings the economy exactly
half way between complete internalization of redistributive externalities
of schooling decisions and complete decentralization, where externalities
are fully ignored, see Dur and Teulings (2001). At that point, the temp-
tation to expropriate past investments in human capital is exactly offset
by the fear of adverse general equilibrium effects by lower future invest-
ments. The lack of ability to commit to future voting behavior works
to the detriment of the lower half of the income distribution, which gets
less redistribution than with commitment. It is therefore in their inter-
est to seek ways to commit not to tax investments in human capital in
the future. For that reason, it may be important not to allow years of
education to be a variable in the tax system. As soon as that variable
enters the system, it opens the door for debate on heavier taxation of hu-
man capital in the future. The debate alone is enough to undermine the
credibility of the incentives for investment in human capital, and thereby
their effectiveness. Therefore, it may be much better to frame subsidies
to the education system in the form of irreversible grants during the
years at school or of direct subsidization of the schools themselves, since
this type of subsidies are much more credible.
5.3 Subsidies to schools versus grants for students
The conclusion of section 4.3 that the direct and the indirect general
equilibrium effects tend to cancel in the simple log linear set up, does
not imply that we should forget about raising the level of education as an
efficient redistribution instrument. Education subsidies make most sense
if one can find policies that limit the direct effect on income while at the
same time maximize the substitution effect on the mean level of human
capital. Such more sophisticated policies are observed in practice. For
instance, in the present model, the only cost of education is foregone
earnings, keeping the quality of the education system fixed. One could
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extend the analysis to the trade off between the quality and the direct
cost of the education system. Then, a typical policy parameter might be
the quality of education in general, and of primary education in partic-
ular. Leuven, Oosterbeek, and Van Ophem (2002) show that there are
considerable differences in the quality of education across countries. An
eyeball test suggests that these differences are related to the amount of
government subsidy to the education system. The big advantage of rais-
ing the quality of primary education is that it has no adverse direct effect
on income and is likely to raise the average skill level in the economy.
However, depending on the exact specification of the education produc-
tion function s (a, h), the greater quality of primary education might be
just offset as people reduce their years of schooling such that marginal
cost and revenues remain equal. A general increase in the quality of
education might be a more attractive alternative, as it opens quality of
education as a second dimension for substitution next to years of ed-
ucation. The greater the total elasticity of educational attainment to
incentives, the cheaper it is for the government to increase the average
level of education by subsidies, and in particular, the less subsidies need
to be paid to high ability types who take up a lot of education.
5.4 Subsidies based on parental income
Another option for improving the effect of a given amount of subsidy on
the average education level in the economy is to include intergenerational
information in the subsidization scheme. The social economic status of
the previous generation is a good indicator of the expected educational
attainment of the next generation, partly by nature effects, partly by
nurture, see Plug and Vijverberg (2002). On average, kids of low educa-
tion families drop out the education system at a younger age and with a
lower skill level. An optimal subsidy to education operates at the mar-
gin, to invoke people to stay at school longer. The problem is that the
margin is located at a different point for each skill group, so that high
skilled workers benefit along the whole range. By using the educational
attainment of the previous generation, subsidies can be tailored more
precisely to the margin, improving the ratio of beneficial incentive ef-
fects versus adverse direct effect on income. In practice, this boils down
to subsidies that are conditional on parental income, an institution that
is widely applied.
5.5 Direct compression of the human capital distri-
bution?
Many policies are geared towards direct compression of the human cap-
ital distribution. The recent Luxembourg and Lisbon summit of the
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EU have again focussed the efforts for investment in human capital on
raising the level of education of least skilled. From a distribution point
of view, this seems to be an obvious idea as it raises the human capital
of the most disadvantaged group. However, a second thought reveals a
number of complications. First, relative to the free market outcome, it
is much simpler to raise everybody’s skill level by a bit than to raise a
particular group’s skill level by a lot, since the dead weight loss increases
quadratically with the deviation from the market outcome. Second, the
general equilibrium effect of stimulating human capital accumulation in
the lowest strata of the distribution work perverse: they raise supply in
the lower part of the distribution, thereby reducing relative wages of the
least skilled, see Teulings (2002) for a detailed analysis. Table 1 provides
some, though far from conclusive empirical evidence on this issue. The
regressions in Panel B include the variance of education as explanatory
variable (Vt). The effect of this variable on the variance of log wages is
close to zero. Hence, the direct effect of a compression of the variance of
education on the variance of earnings is fully offset by adverse general
equilibrium effects.
The argument is very much comparable to the discussion on min-
imum wages. An increase in minimum wages reduces labor supply at
the bottom of the labor market, thereby increasing the relative wages
of their best substitutes, slightly better skilled workers. The argument
is illustrated in Figure 4. Suppose that we introduce a minimum wage,
that eliminates the left tail of the human capital distribution, reducing
the effective supply of low skilled workers. Firms will shift their demand
for these low skilled workers to the closest available substitute, slightly
better skilled workers, type s+. Hence, the introduction of the minimum
wage will increase the wages of type s+ workers substantially. Firms
that used these type s+ workers before the introduction of the minimum
wage will find their cost having been increased. They will substitute to
the closest substitute, type s++ workers, s++ being slightly higher than
s+. Hence, their wages go up, but by slightly less than the wages of
type s+. This yields the type of pattern shown in Figure 4, with large
spillover effects of an increase in the minimum wage to workers earning
wages just above the minimum. This type of pattern has been docu-
mented for the United States by Lee (1999) and Teulings (2000, 2003).
A decrease of the minimum wage by 10 % causes the wages of workers
earning slightly more than the minimum to go down by 8 % (Teulings,
2003). Basically, all of the increase in inequality in the lower half of the
labor market in the United States during the eighties can be explained
by the fall in minimum wages.
FIGURE 4
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Similarly, programs like the EITC and New Deal can be victim of
their own success. The large subsidies to the employment of the least
skilled raise their supply, and thereby invoke adverse general equilibrium
effects, which might undo the gains of the initial subsidies. The only net
effect would be an increase in the marginal tax rates for the better skilled
workers to finance the subsidies to the least skilled.
6 Conclusion
The general equilibrium effect of investment in human capital provide
a forceful argument for the subsidization of education for a government
that wants to redistribute income. Previous studies on optimal taxation
have always downplayed the importance of general equilibrium effects.
The reason that these effects show up much more prominently in this
study is that we use a more realistic production technology, based on
comparative advantage of high skilled workers in complex job types.
Contrary to for example a two type CES technology, this production
technology implies that the whole wage schedule becomes flatter as a
result of an increase in the average stock of human capital. An efficient
redistribution policy should therefore combine progressive income taxa-
tion and subsidies to the formation of human capital. Crude calculations
suggest that this model provides a rationale for subsidies to the educa-
tion system of about the level that we observe empirically. Moreover, the
model suggests positive cross country relation between the progressivity
of income taxes and the rate of subsidization of the education system:
the more redistributive a country’s income policy, the higher will be both
the progressivity of the tax system and the subsidy to education system.
This relation is also borne out by the data, with a slope that fits the
theoretical predictions closely.
However, there is an effect working in the opposite direction. Since
the take up of schooling is complementary to innate ability, the direct
effect of a subsidy to education tends to favor high ability types. Our
overview of some empirical studies suggests that both effects cancel.
Much depends on what one believes about the price elasticity of the
demand for education. The higher the elasticity, the more education
should be subsidized. Moreover, the result that the direct and the indi-
rect more or less cancel does not imply that we should forget about the
argument. The simple log-linear income policy analyzed in this paper is
applied merely for reasons of tractability. One can think of more elabo-
rate schemes that increase the substitution effects of education subsidies,
while at the same time reduce the adverse direct effect on income, in par-
ticular policies aimed at raising the quality of education and grants for
students which depend on parental income.
27
The log linearity of the income policy imposes another strong restric-
tion. It implies increasing marginal tax rates (for dy < 1), offending the
logic of the Sadka (1976) argument for low marginal rates at both ends
of the income distribution. Interestingly, this argument can be extended
towards education subsidies, but then reversed. Where in the case of
income taxation, the direct effect on income are desired for the pur-
pose of redistribution while the substitution effects only cause efficiency
losses, here the substitution effects contribute to the redistribution while
the direct effect on income work in the opposite direction. Hence, the
marginal rate of education subsidies should be high at the bottom and
at the top, where they do not cause substantial direct effects on income
since there are no people earning less than the lowest or more than the
highest income. The previous argument regarding the quality of primary
education exploits this idea at the lower end of the distribution. Where
this idea fits the layman’s intuition, its counterpart is more surprising.
A subsidy for top education programs has little adverse direct effect on
income (since there are not many people taking up more years of edu-
cation), while it raises the average level of education. The production
function applied in this paper implies that all lower ability types will
benefit from the general equilibrium effects of this policy, see Teulings
(2002).
The analysis of the optimal functional form of taxes and education
subsidies has strong policy implication for programs like the EITC and
the New Deal, along the lines suggested by Heckman, Lochner, and
Taber (1999). These programs aim at a reduction of marginal tax rates
for the lowest ability types in order to combat low-skilled unemployment.
The government budget constraint then dictates that marginal rates
should be increased for higher ability types. The logic of the argument
in this paper suggests that this policy can be victim of its own success.
To the extent that the subsidies induce low ability types to go to work,
the relative increase in low skilled labor supply will reduce their wages,
thereby partially undoing the initial effect of the subsidy. Stated more
crudely: there is limit to the demand for hamburger flippers. At the
same time, the increase in marginal rates for somewhat higher skill types,
which is necessary to satisfy the government budget constraint, reduces
the incentive for investment in human capital, which further aggravates
the problem. This points to the need of a more formal analysis of the
functional form of the optimal policy.
7 Appendix: Production technology and wages
Consider an economy where the production of one unit of output re-
quires the input of an infinite number of tasks, indexed by their level of
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complexity, c. The price of a unit of output is taken as the numeraire
and is therefore normalized to unity. Both the skill level s and the com-
plexity level c vary continuously and can take any real number. The
transformation of tasks into output takes place by a Leontieff technol-
ogy: tasks are required in fixed proportions.12 The skill distribution is
normal, s˜N (µ, σ2). The size of the workforce is normalized to unity.
The input requirements of c-type tasks per unit of output are described
by a normal distribution, with the same variance as the skill distribution,
c˜N (0, σ2). A c-type task can be produced by any s-type worker. How-
ever, the relative productivities of various worker types differ according
to the complexity of the task:
g (s, c) = −1
γ
eγ(c−s)
where g (s, c) is the log productivity of skill type s in a task of complex-
ity c. This specification implies comparative advantage of high skilled
workers in complex jobs, since gsc > 0: the productivity ratio of type s1
and s2, s2 < s1, is increasing in c. Teulings (1995) shows that this set
up implies that every task type c is uniquely assigned to a single worker
type s (c), and vice versa. Furthermore, better skilled workers are as-
signed to more complex jobs, s0 (c) > 0, due to comparative advantage.
The equilibrium of supply and demand for each task type c requires, in
logs:
−
µ
s (c)− µ
σ
¶2
+ g [s (c) , c] + ln s0 (c) = −
³ c
σ
´2
+ Y (12)
where Y is log output per unit of the workforce. The left hand side
is the log supply of labor of type s (c) (the log of the normal density
function) plus its log productivity in task type c plus the log Jacobian
ds
dc
= s0 (c). The two terms on the right hand side measure the log
demand for task type c: the Leontieff coefficient (again the log of the
normal density) plus log output. Equation (12) is a differential equation
in s (c). The special case, where the variances of the skill distribution
and the complexity demand distribution are equal, is the only for which
12Contrary to suggestion by some commentators, the assumption of a Leontieff
technology is not crucial for our results. Teulings (2000) shows that replacing the
Leontieff technology by a Cobb Douglas technology is (almost) observationally equiv-
alent to halving the value of γ. As long as there is a slight imperfection in the substi-
tutability between c types in the production of output, the distribution of c does not
fully adjust to shifts in the distribution of s, and hence relative wages have to change.
The advantage of using the Leontieff technology is that the differential equation (12)
can be solved analytically.
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this differential equation has an analytical solution:
s (c)= c+ µ (13)
Y =L− 1
γ
e−γµ
For the derivation of the (unique) wage equation that is consistent with
this assignment, we define x(s, c) to be the log production cost of c-type
tasks by a s-type worker:
x(s, c) = w(s, µ)− g(s, c) (14)
that is, log production cost in log wages per worker minus log produc-
tivity per worker. In a market equilibrium, workers are assigned to tasks
such that production cost for task c is minimized. The first-order con-
dition reads:
xs [s(c), c] =ws [s (c) , µ]− gs [s (c) , c] = 0 =⇒ (15)
ws (µ)= gs [c− µ, c] = e−γµ
The intercept w0 (µ) remains to be determined. This is derived from
the numeraire. Production cost per task weighted by their Leontieff
coefficient add up to unity:
1=
Z ∞
−∞
1
σ
φ
³ c
σ
´
ex[s(c),c]dc
=
Z ∞
−∞
1
σ
φ
µ
c− σ2e−γµ
σ
¶
ew0+(µ+γ
−1)e−γµ+ 12σ2e−2γµdc
where the second line follows from the substitution of equation (13),
(14), and (15), and some rearrangement. Hence:
w0 (µ) = −
¡
µ+ γ−1
¢
e−γµ − µe−γµ − 1
2
e−2γµσ2 (16)
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Figure 1. Twisting of the wage function 
 
 
 
 
  
w(s, µ)  
s
w(s, µ0)
w(s, µ1) 
µ1 > µ0
w(s, µ1) 
Figure 2. Return to education, education and inequality 
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B. Returns to education and inequality 
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 Figure 3: Education subsidies and progressivity of the income tax in OECD countries 
 
*   change in the after-tax wage, % of change in the before-tax wage.
**  public expenditure, % of gross domestic product, in 1994.
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  source:  OECD (1996), Life long learning for all, Paris; Table 1.12 
OECD (1997), Education at a Glance – OECD indicators, 
Paris 
OECD (1997), Implementing the jobs study: Member 
countries experience, Paris (for Belgium on page 91, Table 
28) 
  
This figure has been taken from Van Ewijk & Tang (2000), page 8, right 
panel of figure 1.  
 
Figure 4: The wage function before and after a minimum wage increase 
 
 
 w(s, min)  
s
w(s, min0) 
w(s, min1) 
w min0
w min1
s+ s0 
w(s+,min1) 
Table 1 
 
A. GDP1 
 
        
  
  
Variable equation in 
first 
differences 
)( 1βS  0.24335 
 (3.84) 
)
2
1( 2
2 βS  -0.00848 
 (2.16) 
  
 
 
B. Income inequality2 
 
 
    
variable equation 
in levels 
equation in first difs 
(1)                       (2) [ ])( 21 SVarS ββ  -0.08573 -0.09820 -0.05611 
 (3.05) (1.40) (1.96) [ ])( 222 SVarS β  0.00170 0.00320 
 (0.78) (0.66) 
   
tV  0.00105 0.00094 -0.00176 
 (0.33) (0.13) (0.29) 
   
 
 
 
1 Controls for year effects, year x S, and all variables in levels one year lagged. 
2 Controls for year effects, year x S, and type of income data. 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
Data sources: GDP: Penn World Table 5.6a; Income inequality: Deininger and Squire (1996); 
Education data: Barro and Lee (1993, 1996). See Teulings and Van Rens (2002) for more details.
Table 2: Regressions of wages on individual’s ability and years of schooling for males 
 
Regressions with schooling without schooling ξ 
 Ability 
(math) 
Ability 
(reading) 
Schooling Ability 
(math) 
Ability 
(reading) 
math reading 
UK NCDS 0.0088 
(8.76) 
0.0079 
(4.89) 
0.0453 
(11.60) 
0.0121 
(12.47) 
0.0110 
(6.00) 
0.28 0.29 
UK BCS 0.0082 
(7.90) 
0.0038 
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(8.84) 
- 0.40 - 
US 1974 0.0366 
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(13.32) 
- 0.52 - 
US 1992 0.0612 
(7.39) 
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(18.87) 
0.1337 
(17.13) 
- 054 - 
 
UK: NCDS Data: Ability measured at the age of  11; endogenous variable: log hourly wages at age 
33; N=3202; BCS Data: Ability measured at the age of 10; endogenous variable: log hourly 
wages at age 30; N=2661. 
Netherlands: Brabant Data: Ability measured at the age of 12 in 1952; endogenous variable: log 
wages; N=837 for 1983, N=505 for 1993 
US: Wisconsin Longitudinal Survey: Ability measured at the age of 16/7 in 1956; endogenous 
variable: log family income (selected data include only complete families); N=2742 for both 
1974 and 1992 
 
T-statistics in parentheses. 
